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Administration of Entireties
Property in Bankruptcy
INTRODUCTION
State law' often permits a husband and wife who own property as tenants
by the entirety2 to immunize the property from seizure by creditors. 3 Federal
bankruptcy law,4 however, seeks to maximize equity to creditors5 by requiring
a debtor to surrender his assets in exchange for a discharge of his debts.
As a result, bankruptcy courts have encountered considerable problems when
administering entireties property.
The most notable problems are: (1) whether an interest in entireties prop-
erty can be reached by joint creditors when a debtor files singly,6 and (2)
if the debtor can exempt his interest, whether the trustee may sell the entireties
property despite the exemption.7 This Note resolves these problems. It also
explains how to administer entireties property depending upon the jurisdic-
tional form of entireties property ownership, the number of debtors filing,
and the type of creditors involved. 8
1. See infra note 24 for a summary of state law creating and interpreting tenancies by the
entireties in the 25 jurisdictions which retain this form of ownership.
2. Tenancy by the entirety is a species of common law concurrent ownership which
developed as part of the English feudal system of land tenures. Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties,
25 TEmp. L.Q. 24 (1951). Essentially, it is a joint tenancy modified by the common law fiction
that husband and wife are one person and by the common law incidents of coverture. 2
AmERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); I.H.' TnANY, TEE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 645 (3d ed. 1920); 2 W. WAISH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 121 (1947); Honigman, Tenancy by Entirety in Michigan, 5 MICH. ST. B.J. 249, 284 (1926).
To remain consistent with the fiction of a third legal entity-the marital unit-the individual
spouses are subsumed as one, and each spouse is deemed to be seized of the entire ownership
interest, not merely of an undivided fractional interest, as with joint tenancy. Craig, An Analysis
of Estates by the Entirety in Bankruptcy, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 255, 256 (1974).
3. Grilliot & Yocum, Tenancy by the Entirety: An Ancient Fiction Frustrates Modern
Creditors, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 341 (1979).
4. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-151326 (West Supp. 1983). The Bankruptcy Code was enacted in
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). Hereinafter,
the Bankruptcy Code will be referred to by that title or simply as the Code.
5. Comment, Bankruptcy Exemptions: State Law or Federal Policy?, 35 U. PIT. L. REv.
630 (1974).
6. See infra notes 47-83 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 84-113 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 114-74 and accompanying text. A chart of proper administration results
is presented infra at Appendix.
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I. DEBTOR V. CREDITOR
A. Entireties Property and the Bankruptcy Estate
It is first necessary to determine whether a debtor who holds property as
a tenant by the entirety has an interest which becomes property of the
bankruptcy estate under section 541(a). 9 Only if he has such an interest will
the exemption and sale provisions become applicable.' 0
9. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982) is titled "Property of the Estate" and reads:
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title
creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever
located:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) (2) of this section, all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement
of the case.
10. The majority of courts which have addressed the issue have concluded, although for
different reasons, that the debtor does have an interest which becomes property of the estate.
See In re Ford, 3 Bankr. 559 (D. Md. 1980); Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Chrystler (In re Trickett),
14 Bankr. 85 (W.D. Mich. 1981); Loeber v. Loeber (Matter of Loeber), 12 Bankr. 669 (D.N.J.
1981); In re Barsotti, 7 Bankr. 205 (W.D. Pa. 1989); Waldschmidt v. Shaw (In re Shaw), 5
Bankr. 107 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); Virginia Nat'l Bank v. Martin (In re Martin), 20 Bankr. 374
(E.D. Va. 1982).
In In re Barsotti, the court reviewed the House and Senate Judiciary Committee Reports,
House and Senate Floor Statements, and the Bankruptcy Commission Report. It concluded
that the intent of § 541(a)(1) is to include all property of the debtor in the bankruptcy estate,
including an interest in tenancy by the entireties property which is merely equitable, such as
an expectancy or right of survivorship. Barsotti, 7 Bankr. at 210. Because § 541 includes both
the legal interests and the equitable interests of the debtor, the court's special attention paid
to the fact that a tenant by the entireties has only an equitable interest was unnecessary.
In In re Ford the court thoroughly examined the Maryland law of tenancies by the entirety.
The court concluded that a debtor has several distinct legal and equitable interests in entireties
property which enter the bankruptcy estate notwithstanding the fact that neither husband nor
wife may sell or dispose of all or any part of the property without the other's assent and that
the spouses share equally in the income from the property while the estate exists. Id. at 562
(citing Ades v. Caplin, 132 Md. 66, 69, 103 A. 94, 95 (1918)); Whitelock v. Whitelock, 156
Md. 115, 143 A. 712 (1928); Masterman v. Masterman, 129 Md. 167, 98 A. 537 (1916). The
debtor was found to have an expectancy based upon his right of survivorship and although
the event of survivorship may be contingent and uncertain, the right to that survivorship interest
was found to be a present interest and not a future contingent right. Ford, 3 Bankr. at 566.
In addition, the court found that the debtor had an indivisible present right to use, possession,
and income from his entireties property. Id. at 566.
The reasoning in the Ford opinion has been adopted by courts in at least three other states
to support a finding that an interest in entireties property becomes property of the bankruptcy
estate. Trickett, 14 Bankr. 85; Shaw, 5 Bankr. 107; Martin, 20 Bankr. 374. Although the
Trickett court adopted the reasoning used in Ford, it based its conclusion on an additional
reason. The court stated that "[i]f there could be any questions on whether a debtor has a
legal or equitable interest in an estate by the entirety, this is resolved by the fact that I 1 U.S.C.
§ 363(h), (i), and G) set forth the procedure for disposal of such property by the trustee."
Trickett, 14 Bankr. at 88.
However, in at least two states, bankruptcy courts have concluded that the debtor's interest
does not enter the estate. See In re Jeffers, 3 Bankr. 49 (N.D. Ind. 1980); Miner v. Anderson
(In re Anderson), 12 Bankr. 483 (W.D. Mo. 1981). In Jeffers the court analyzed the legislative
history of the Bankruptcy Code and concluded that while Congress may have intended real
estate held by the entireties to come into the debtor's estate through § 541(a)(1), the intent of
the House Judiciary Committee in its report accompanying H.R. 8200 was clear-tenancies by
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The drafters of section 541(a) created a broad general definition of prop-
erty of the estate. The statute reads:
The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this
title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following
property, wherever located:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section,
all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case."
The language "all legal or equitable interests" does not exclude any of the
debtor's interests in property. 2 In addition, subsections (b) and (c)(2) exclude
certain powers exercisable solely for the benefit of others and the debtor's
interest in a spendthrift trust, but they do not exclude any interest in entireties
property. 3 Thus, the ordinary meaning of the statutory language 4 indicates
the entirety should not be invalidated. Jeffers, 3 Bankr. at 56 (emphasis added). The court
further concluded that since, under Indiana law, tenants by the entirety do not have a separate
or individual interest in real estate, allowing entireties property to become part of the estate
and allowing exemptions thereon and sale pursuant to § 363(h) of the Code would, in effect,
change Indiana law regarding real estate held as entireties property. Jeffers, 3 Bankr. at 56.
Because the legislative history was found to be inconclusive about whether entireties property
enters the bankruptcy estate but perfectly clear as to invalidation of tenancies by the entirety,
the court felt compelled to hold that, in Indiana, entireties property does not become property
of the estate pursuant to § 541.
In Anderson, as in Jeffers, the court concluded that entirety property may not be brought
into the bankruptcy estate. Anderson, 12 Bankr. at 490. The Anderson court reasoned that
because under Missouri law a debtor had no right to the use, enjoyment, or income from the
property apart from his spouse, he could not be regarded as having any legal or equitable
interest in the property as of the commencement of the case. Id. (citing Schwind v. O'Halloran,
346 Mo. 486, 142 S.W.2d 55 (1940); Otto F. Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo.
159, 201 S.W. 67 (1918); Frost v. Frost, 200 Mo. 474, 98 S.W. 527 (1906)). The court
distinguished cases in Maryland and Florida in which courts had held that entireties property
does enter the bankruptcy estate by stating that because state law is determinative of the debtor's
interest in entireties property, it was possible for the property to enter the estate under Maryland
and Florida law but not under Missouri law. Anderson, 12 Bankr. at 488-90. It is interesting
to note that the Anderson court ignored Barsotti, which was decided prior to Anderson in a
state with identical incidents of entireties property ownership and which reached the opposite
result.
These conflicting judicial opinions illustrate the need for a more goal-oriented analytical
approach to better serve the contemporary needs of bankruptcy courts and practitioners.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
12. All interests in property are either legal or equitable. See I THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY
(1980 Replacement) § 5, p. 27. See also Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v. Patterson, 308 11.
519, 139 N.E. 912 (1923) (stating entire interest consists of legal and equitable interests);
Charmicor, Inc. v. Bradshaw Fin. Co., 92 Nev. 310, 550 P.2d 413 (1976) (stating that after
legal interests were terminated, only equitable interest remained); In re Glosser's Estate, 355
Pa. 210, 49 A.2d 401 (1946) (stating that a beneficiary without any interest has neither a legal
nor an equitable interest).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b) (1982) reads:
Property of the estate does not include-
(1) any power that the debtor may exercise solely for the benefit of an
entity other than the debtor; or
(2) any interest of the debtor as a lessee under a lease of nonresidential
real property that has terminated at the expiration of the stated term of
such lease before the commencement of the case under this title, and ceases
19851
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that any interest the debtor has in entireties property becomes property of
the bankruptcy estate.'-'
This conclusion is confirmed by examination of the legislative history of
section 541. Section 541's predecessor, section 70(a) of the tepealed Bank-
ruptcy Act,' 6 incorporated the "title" theory of property law. Section 70
was a detailed legislative scheme which listed several kinds of property, title
to which passed to the trustee upon the filing of the petition. 7 Paragraph
(5) of section 70(a)'8 provided, inter alia, that the trustee was vested with
title to "property, including rights of action, which prior to the filing of
the petition [the bankrupt] could by any means have transferred or which
might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him,
or otherwise seized, impounded or sequestered." Whether particular property
to include any interest of the debtor as a lessee under a lease of nonresi-
dential real property that has terminated at the expiration of the stated
term of such lease during the case.
11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1982) reads: "A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of
the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in
a case under this title."
14. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that unless otherwise defined, words
will be interpreted as taking their ordinary meaning. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 49
(1979).
15. There is good reason to question the value of an individual debtor's interest in entireties
property. Indeed, the sponsors of the Code legislation in each congressional chamber stated,
"foinly the debtor's interest in such property becomes property of the estate." 124 CONG. Rac.
32,399 (1978); 124 CONG. REc. 33,999 (1978) (emphasis added). However, that an individual
debtor has an interest in entireties property cannot be seriously questioned. See Craig, supra
note 2, at 256.
16. 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a) (West Supp. 1952).
17. See infra note 18.
18. Section 70(a)(5) of the repealed Act read:
a. The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt and his successor or successors, if
any, upon his or their appointment and qualification, shall in turn be vested by
operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the
petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, except insofar as it is to property
which is held to be exempt, to all of the following kinds of property wherever
located ...
(5) property, including rights of action, which prior to the filing of the
petition he could by any means have transferred or which might have been
levied upon and sold under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized,
impounded, or sequestered: Provided, That rights of action ex delicto for
libel, slander, injuries to the person of the bankrupt or of a relative, whether
or not resulting in death, seduction, and criminal conversation shall not
vest in the trustee unless by the law of the State such rights of action are
subject to attachment, execution, garnishment, sequestration, or other ju-
dicial process: And, provided further, That when any bankrupt, who is a
natural person, shall have any insurance policy which has a cash surrender
value payable to himself, his estate, or personal representatives, he may,
within thirty days after the cash surrender value has been ascertained and
stated to the trustee by the company issuing the same, pay or secure to
the trustee the sum so ascertained and stated, and continue to hold, own
and carry such policy free from the claims of the creditors participating
in the distribution of his estate under the bankruptcy proceedings, otherwise
the policy shall pass to the trustee as assets.
[Vol. 60:305
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could have been "transferred" or "levied upon" was determined by reference
to state law, and when state laws differed, so did bankruptcy administration
results.' 9 Federal courts were essentially allowed only to place a federal gloss
on state property law concepts. 20
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 21 in its
report issued to Congress in 1973,22 recognized the problem of whether jointly
owned property was part of the estate under section 70(a).23 The Commission
recommended simplification of the definition of property of the bankruptcy
estate to minimize the necessity of resorting to state law24 for a determination
19. Compare Carmona v. Robinson, 336 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1964) (finding that based upon
California law, a cause of action for personal injuries is an asset of the estate) with Hayes v.
Buda, 323 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1963) (finding that based upon Wisconsin law, a cause of action
for personal injuries is not an asset of the estate). See generally Countryman, The Use of State
Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part 1), 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 407, 466-73 (1972) (providing examples
of differing bankruptcy administration results).
20. See the report by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. I at 194 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BKRTcY. Comm.
REPORT].
21. Created by Public Law 91-354 on July 24, 1970, the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States was established to "study, analyze, evaluate, and recommend changes
in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898." BKRTCY. Comm. REPORT, supra note 20, pt. I at 1.
22. BKRTCY. Comm. REPORT, supra note 20.
23. Id., pt. I at 195.
24. Modern variations of tenancies by the entirety exist in these 25 jurisdictions: Alaska-
ALAsKA STAT. § 34.15.140 (1975) (recognizing the right to hold an estate in land as tenants by
the entirety, with right of survivorship); Arkansas-Cross v. Pharr, 215 Ark. 463, 221 S.W.2d
24 (1949); Union & Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hudson, 147 Ark. 7, 227 S.W. 1 (1921) (entireties
may exist in any type of assets); Delaware-Hoyle v. Hoyle, 31 Del. Ch. 64, 66 A.2d 130
(1949); Ciconte v. Barba, 19 Del. Ch. 6, 161 A. 925 (1932); Rauht v. Reinhart, 180 A. 913
(Del. Orph. 1935) (entireties may exist in any type of assets); District of Columbia-Flaherty
v. Columbus, 41 App. D.C. 525 (1914) (estates by the entirety exist in both personalty and
realty); Florida-Rader v. First Nat'l Bank, 42 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1949); Dodson v. National Title
Ins. Co., 159 Fla. 371, 31 So. 2d 402 (1947); American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Whitlock, 122 Fla.
363, 165 So. 380 (1936); Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925) (entireties may exist
in any type of assets); Hawaii-In re Dean's Trust, 47 Hawaii 629, 394 P.2d 432 (1964); Fung
v. Chang, 47 Hawaii 149, 384 P.2d 303 (1963) (indicating that the usufruct is split equally
between husband and wife, but other incidents unknown); HAwAn REv. STAT. § 509.2 (Supp.
1982) (entireties may exist in any type of assets); Indiana-Koehring v. Bowman, 194 Ind. 433,
142 N.E. 117 (1924) (entireties may exist in real property only, except that the proceeds derived
from sale or conversion of entireties realty may be held by entireties); Kentucky-Stambaugh
v. Stambaugh, 288 Ky. 491, 156 S.W.2d 827 (1941); Laun v. DePasqualte, 254 Ky. 314, 71
S.W.2d 641 (1934); Hoffman v. Newell, 249 Ky. 270, 60 S.W.2d 607 (1932); Francis v. Vastine,
220 Ky. 431, 17 S.W.2d 419 (1929) (providing only for entireties ownership of realty); KY.
REv. STAT. § 381.050(2) (Supp. 1982); Maryland-Beard v. Beard, 185 Md. 178, 44 A.2d 469
(1945); Young v. Cockman, 182 Md. 246, 34 A.2d 428 (1943); Hammond v. Dugan, 166 Md.
402, 170 A. 757 (1934); Brell v. Brell, 143 Md. 443, 122 A. 635 (1923); Baker v. Baker, 123
Md. 32, 90 A. 776 (1914); Brewer v. Bowersox, 92 Md. 567, 48 A. 1060 (1901); Pannone v.
McLaughlin, 37 Md. App. 395, 377 A.2d 597 (1977) (entireties may exist in any type of assets);
Massachusetts-Childs v. Childs, 293 Mass. 67, 199 N.E. 383 (1936); Splaine v. Morrissey, 282
Mass. 217, 184 N.E. 670 (1933) (entireties may exist in any type of assets); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 209, § I (West 1979) (entireties usufruct is split equally; spouses are entitled to equal
control, management, and possession); Michigan-Moore v. Van Goosen, 250 Mich. 67, 229
N.W. 451 (1930); Scholten v. Scholten, 238 Mich. 679, 214 N.W. 320 (1927); Wait v. Bovee,
35 Mich. 425 (1877) (entireties may exist only in realty or, by agreement, in proceeds from
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of what constitutes "property.''2
After hearings were held in both houses of Congress on the Commission's
proposed legislation, the House Committee on the Judiciary reported H.R.
sale of entireties realty) (but see dictum in Frank v. Patton, 251 Mich. 557, 232 N.W. 211
(1930) (suggesting that personal property may be held by the entireties)); MICH. Coup. LAWS
ANN. § 557.71 (West Supp. 1983-84) (usufruct, control, and management are split equally
between spouses); Mississippi-Cuevas v. Cuevas, 191 So. 2d 843 (Miss. 1966) (incidents of
entireties ownership unknown, but the tenancy cannot be destroyed by the act of one tenant);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-7 (Supp. 1983); Missouri-Schwind v. O'Halloran, 346 Mo. 486, 142
S.W.2d 55 (1940); Cullum v. Rice, 236 Mo. App. 1113, 162 S.W.2d 342 (1942) (entireties may
exist in any type of assets); New Jersey-Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Freile, 116 N.J. Eq. 278, 173
A. 93 (1934); Central Trust Co. v. Street, 95 N.J. Eq. 278, 127 A. 82 (1923); Aubrey v.
Schneider, 69 N.J. Eq. 629, 60 A. 929 (1905); Able-Old Hickory Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Polansky, 47 A.2d 730 (N.J. Ch. 1946) (entireties may exist in real property only); N.J. REv.
STAT. § 37:2-18 (West Supp. 1983-84); New York-In re Maguire's Will, 277 N.Y. 527, 13
N.E.2d 458 (1938); In re Blumenthal's Estate, 236 N.Y. 448, 141 N.E. 911 -(1923); In re
McKelway's Estate, 221 N.Y. 15, 116 N.E. 348 (1917); In re McKinney's Estate, 175 Misc.
377, 24 N.Y.S.2d 906 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (entireties may exist in real property only, except a chose
in action for money still owing on a sale of entireties realty); N.Y. EST. POWES & TRUSTS
LAW § 6-2.2 (McKinney 1983-84); North Carolina-Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N.C. 396, 42 S.E.2d 468
(1947); Dozier v. Leary, 196 N.C. 12, 144 S.E. 368 (1928); Winchester Simmons Co. v. Cutler, 194
N.C. 698, 140 S.E. 622 (1927); Turlington v. Lucas, 186 N.C. 282, 119 S.E. 366 (1923) (entireties
may exist in real property only; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.5 (Cum. Supp. 1983); Oklahoma-OKILA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 74 (West 1971) (allowing creation of entireties estates, but expressly providing
that levy and sale of a single spouse's interest constitutes a valid severance); Oregon-Manning v.
United States Nat'l Bank, 174 Or. 118, 148 P.2d 255 (1944); Halman v. Mays, 154 Or. 241, 59 P.2d
392 (1936); Nunner v. Erickson, 151 Or. 575, 51 P.2d 839 (1935); Webb v. Woodcock, 134 Or. 319,
290 P. 751 (1930); Smith v. Durkee, 121 Or. 86, 254 P. 207 (1927); Ganoe v. Ohmart, 121 Or.
116, 254 P. 203 (1927); Stout v. Van Zante, 109 Or. 430, 219 P. 804 (1923) (entireties may
exist in real property only); OR. REv. STAT. § 108-090(2) (1981); Pennsylvania-Blummer v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 362 Pa. 7, 66 A.2d 245 (1949); United States Nat'l Bank v. Penrod,
354 Pa. 170, 47 A.2d 249 (1946) (entireties may exist in any type of assets); Rhode Island-
Van Ausdall v. Van Ausdall, 48 R.I. 106, 135 A. 850 (1927); Quinn v. Drummond, 47 R.I.
215, 132 A. 439 (1926); Wilder v. Aldrich, 2 R.I. 518 (1853) (entireties may exist only in real
property); Tennessee-State v. Progressive Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 174 Tenn. 597, 129 S.W.2d
513 (1939); Campbell v. Campbell, 167 Tenn. 77, 66 S.W.2d 990 (1934); Moore v. Chase, 25
Tenn. App. 239, 156 S.W.2d 84 (1941) (entireties may exist in any type of assets); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-602 (Supp. 1983); Vermont-Swanton Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Tremblay, 113 Vt.
530, 37 A.2d 381 (1944); George v. Dutton's Estate, 94 Vt. 76, 108 A. 515 (1920); Citizens'
Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Jenkins, 91 Vt. 13, 99 A. 250 (1916) (entireties may exist in any
type of assets); Virgin Islands-Masonry Prods. Inc. v. Tees, 280 F. Supp. 654 (D. St. Croix
1968); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 28, § 7 (1975); Virginia-Allen v. Parkey, 154 Va. 739, 149 S.E.
615 (1929) (entireties may exist in real property); Wyoming-Nussbacher v. Manderfield, 64
Wyo. 55, 186 P.2d 548 (1947); Peters v. Dona, 49 Wyo. 306, 54 P.2d 817 (1936) (entireties
may exist in realty); WYo. STAT. § 34-1-140 (1977).
25. Property of the estate was simply defined in the Commission's Report as "all property
of the debtor as of the date of the petition" and property inherited within six months after
the filing, subject to three minor exceptions. The exceptions were for limitations on community
property, property subject to a power of appointment, and contingent future interests. BKRTCY.
COMm. REPORT, supra note 20, pt. II at 147.
The Commission clearly expressed its intent to include interests in jointly owned property
in the bankruptcy estate:
Under the proposed Act, the undivided interest of a spouse who is a debtor in
a case under the Act is property of the estate. This is contrary to the present Act
which looks to state law to determine what happens with respect to property
ENTIRETIES PROPERTY IN BANKRUPTCY
820026 favorably to the full House of Representatives for consideration. The
Judiciary Committee report discussed the changes in what was to constitute
property of the debtor's estate: 27
The bill determines what is property of the estate by a simple reference
to what interests in property the debtor has at the commencement of the
case.p ] This includes all interests, such as interests in real or personal
property, tangible and intangible property, choses in action, causes of
action, rights such as copyrights, trade-marks, patents, and processes,[ 29]
contingent interests and future interests, whether or not transferable by
the debtor.J[°0 ...
These changes will bring anything of value that the debtors have into
the estate. The exemption section[,'] will permit an individual debtor to
take out of the estate that property that is necessary for a fresh start
and for the support of himself and his dependents. Certain restrictions
on the transferability of property will prevent the trustee from realizing
on some items of property of the estate. 3 2] But on the whole, the trustee
will be able to bring all property together for a coherent evaluation of
its value and transferability, and then to dispose of it for the benefit of
the debtor's creditors.'
Such broad language clearly indicates that the legislation was intended to
incorporate the Commission's suggestion that the bankruptcy estate include
all of the debtor's property regardless of how limited his interest in that
property. The Committee Report even made specific reference to tenancies
by the entirety in the following context:
With respect to ... co-ownership interest, such as tenancies by the
entirety ... the bill does not invalidate the right but provides a method
jointly owned by a husband and wife.
Id., pt. I at 195 (footnote omitted). The second part of the Commission's Report, in a note
accompanying this particular section of the proposed statute, reiterates the clear intent that the
estate of the debtor is to include all property owned by the debtor including "undivided interests
in property." Id., pt. Il at 149 n.2.
26. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
27. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5963 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. In criticizing the existing law the
Committee wrote, "[c]urrent law is a complicated melange of references to State law, and does
little to further the bankruptcy policy of distribution of the debtor's property to his creditor
in satisfaction of his debts." Id. at 175 (citing Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)
(1970); BKRTCY. Cosm. REPORT, supra note 20, pt. I at 192-95; Countryman, supra note 19,
at 473-74).
28. HousE REPORT, supra note 27, at 175 (citing H.R. 8200, § 101 (proposed 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a)(1))).
29. HousE REPORT, supra note 27, at 175 (emphasis added) (citing Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(2),
I 1 U.S.C. § I 10(a)(2) (1970); Countryman, supra note 19, at 473-74).
30. HousE REPORT, supra note 27, at 175-76 (emphasis added) (citing H.R. 8200, § 101
(proposed 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1))).
31. HousE REPORT, supra note 27, at 176 (emphasis added) (citing H.R. 8200, § 101
(proposed 11 U.S.C. § 522)).
32. HousE REPORT, supra note 27, at 176 (emphasis added) (comparing proposed 11 U.S.C.
§ 363 with BKRTCY. Comm. REPORT, supra note 20, pt. II at 147-48, and H.R. 31, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., § 4-601(b) (1975)).
33. HousE REPORT, supra note 27, at 176 (emphasis added).
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by which the estate may[] realize on the value of the debtor's interest
in the property while protecting the other rights. The trustee is permitted
to realize on the value of the property by being permitted to sell it
without obtaining the consent or a waiver of rights by the spouse of the
debtor or the co-owner, as may be required for a complete sale under
applicable State law.[35] The other interest is protected under H.R. 8200
by giving the spouse a right of first refusal at a sale of the property,[36]
and by requiring the trustee to pay over to the spouse the value of the
spouse's interest in the property if the trustee sells the property to
someone other than the spouse.
37
H.R. 8200 was passed and sent to the Senate for consideration, but the
Senate Judiciary Committee reported its own bill, S. 2266,18 to the full
Senate. Though the provisions discussed here were identical in both bills,
the Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee does not specifically discuss
tenancy by entirety property.39 However, the Senate Report did emphasize
that "[t]he scope of this paragraph is broad" and that section 541(a)(1)
"includes as property of the estate all property of the debtor, even that
34. The court in In re Anderson, 12 Bankr. 483, emphasized this permissive language in
the Committee Report and concluded that it must mean that
in states like Missouri, where the entiretyship gives the debtor, standing alone,
no legal or equitable right, the entirety property cannot be deemed to have passed
into the estate in bankruptcy. To conclude otherwise would be to violate the
maxim otherwise plainly and unequivocally expressed in the legislative history to
the effect that section 541 cannot be employed to enlarge the rights of the debtor
beyond those which existed as of the date of the commencement of the case.
Id. at 490. Such a conclusion is unnecessary, however, because the permissive language could
be construed to refer to the contingency inherent in 11 U.S.C. § 363 providing for a sale of
certain co-owned property. For example, in In re Shaw, 5 Bankr. 107, the court held that a
mere survivorship interest owned by a debtor is not sufficient to allow a sale of entireties
property by the trustee. The language of the Committee Report could be interpreted to be
permissive with respect to cases such as Shaw, but to be made mandatory in cases where the
trustee is able to sell the property. This is a more consistent interpretation of the Report because
in the sentences following the word "may," the Committee proceeds to discuss the advantages
of allowing the trustee to sell the property without the non-debtor spouse's consent and the
protections provided to the non-debtor spouse when the sale occurs. The Anderson court's
suggestion that the above interpretation will enlarge the rights of the debtor beyond those which
he hid at the commencement of the case is also not persuasive. Admittedly, the debtor was
unable to terminate or to partition the entiretyship prior to the commencement of the case;
but permitting the trustee to sell the property and thereby to terminate the entiretyship does
nothing to enlarge the debtor's rights.
35. HousE REPORT, supra note 27, at 177 (citing H.R. 8200, § 101 (proposed 11 U.S.C.
§ 363(g))).
36. HousE REPORT, supra note 27, at 177 (citing H.R. 8200, § 101 (proposed 11 U.S.C.
§ 363(h))).
37. HousE REPORT, supra note 27, at 177 (citing H.R. 8200, § 101 (proposed 11 U.S.C. §
363(i))). This is the particular language which was found to be persuasive in holding that
entireties property becomes property of the estate by the Trickett court, 14 Bankr. at 88.
38. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
39. The debtor in Ford, 3 Bankr. 559, argued that it was significant that a detailed Senate
Report, issued subsequent to a House Report, made no mention whatever of the tenancy by
the entirety problem. The court dismissed the argument as unpersuasive because the positions
taken by Congressman Edwards and Senator DeConcini in their floor statements were consistent
with the position expressed in the House Report. Id. at 567.
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needed for a fresh start." 4 The Senate later adopted S. 2266 as an amend-
ment to H.R. 8200.
Rather than proceeding to conference, both the House and the Senate
made additional amendments to the bill. H.R. 8200, as amended 4 ' passed
the Senate on October 5, 1978, and the House on October 6, 1978. Prior
to passage of the compromise version of the Code, Senator DeConcini and
Representative Edwards made the following identical remarks on the floor
of their respective chambers:
Section 541(a)(7) is new. The provision clarifies that any interest in
property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the case is
property of the estate .... The addition of this provision by the House
amendment merely clarifies that section 541(a) is an all-embracing def-
inition .... 42
Representative Edwards added, "[t]hus, as section 541(a)(1) clearly states,
the estate is comprised of all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case. To the extent such an interest
is limited in the hands of the debtor, it is equally limited in the hands of
the estate. ' 43 And, in discussing both the meaning of "property" and the
broad scope of section 541, Representative Edwards remarked that "[allthough
'property' is not construed in this section [1021, it is used consistently
throughout the Code in its broadest sense.""4
Based upon the statutory language and the legislative history of section
541, it is apparent that Congress intended to include all property in which
the debtor has an interest at the time of the commencement of the case in
the bankruptcy estate.45 More specifically, congressional intent is that a
debtor's undivided interest in property which he holds as a tenant by the
entirety, such as present interests in the use, possession, income, and right
of survivorship, shall become property of the estate.46
40. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 82-83 (1978) (emphasis added).
41. Section 541(a)(1) and the subsections of § 363 of H.R. 8200 and S. 2266 differ insignif-
icantly from those enacted in the Code.
For a detailed discussion of the legislative history, see generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
app. v-xxix (L. King 15th ed. 1979); Klein, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 53 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 1 (1979); A. RESNICK & E. WyPysKi, BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978: A
LEGISLATVE HISTORY (1979).
42. 124 CONG. REc 32,399 (1978); 124 CONG. REc. 33,999 (1978) (emphasis added). See
supra note 15 for an additional comment by the sponsors.
43. 124 CONG. REC. 32,399 (1978). Though Representative Edwards' statement indicates
that entireties property interests will be limited in the hands of the estate, it clearly indicates
an intent that the entireties property, at a minimum, will enter the estate.
44. 124 CONG. REc. 32,393.
45. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that the majority of bankruptcy courts
which have decided the issue have reached the same conclusion. See supra note 10.
46. This conclusion is further supported by several comparisons made by the court in Ford,
3 Bankr. 559, between § 541(a)(1) of the Code and § 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act and between
§§ 541(a)(1) and 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code. See also Barsotti, 7 Bankr. at 210-11 (making similar
comparisons); Trickett, 14 Bankr. at 88-89 (comparing § 541(a)(1) to § 363(h), (i), and (j) of
the Code).
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B. Exemptions Under Section 522(b)(2)(B)47
It is next necessary to determine whether the interest in entireties property
may be exempted by the debtor from administration by the trustee pursuant
to section 522(b)(2)(B). 41 At present, the most difficult exemption situation
involves a debtor who files singly with joint creditors. The dispute centers
on whether section 522(b)(2)(B) should be construed such that, unless both
spouses file for bankruptcy, entireties property interests may be exempted
from the estate.
1. The Conflict
In In re Ford, 49 joint creditors were not allowed to reach entireties property
where only one spouse had filed for bankruptcy. The court explained that
Mr. Ford's individual undivided interest as a tenant by the entirety was what
became an asset of the estate. This interest alone was not subject to the
claim of either individual or joint creditors of Mr. Ford and his wife.50
The court reasoned that joint creditors of Mr. and Mrs. Ford could have
levied upon or sold only the entireties property consisting of the entire,
combined, and unsevered interests, as a unity, of both Mr. and Mrs. Ford,
but could not have levied upon or sold either of their individual undivided
interests. In order for joint creditors to execute upon entireties property, the
debtor's interests must be joined with the interests of the non-debtor spouse.
Because such is not the case where a debtor files alone for bankruptcy, joint
47. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982) reads:
(b) Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt
from property of the estate either-
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless
the State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of
this subsection specifically does not so authorize; or, in the alternative,
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection
(d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date of
the filing of the petition at the place in which the debtor's domicile has
been located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of the filing
of the petition, or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any
other place; and
(B) any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before
the commencement of the case, an interest as a tenant by the entirety or
joint tenant to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety or
joint tenant is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
48. Exemption in this context is not a reference to particular exemptions allowed debtors
by state law. Section 522(b)(2)(A) refers to such exemptions. Rather, the phrase "exempt from
process" in § 522(b)(2)(B) must mean "immune from process." That is, the debtor's interests
which are exemptible are those which cannot be reached by creditors, not because of legislative
directive, but because of the inherent nature of the property interest. For example, an individual
spouse's interest in tenancy by the entirety property cannot be reached by creditors; otherwise,
the very purpose of entirety ownership-protection of the fictional marital unit-would be
defeated. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
49. 3 Bankr. 559 (D. Md. 1980).
50. Id.
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creditors may not reach the entireties property or the debtor's interest in
that property"
In contrast, in Napotnik v. Equibank & Parkvale Savings Association,52 a
debtor filing singly was allowed to exempt only his equity in entireties property
that was in excess of the liens of joint creditors. 53 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that "a creditor with a joint judgment on a joint debt may
levy upon the property itself and thus upon the interests of both spouses." 54
The Napotnik court did not distinguish Ford. Instead, it merely sum-
marized the result in Ford15 and proceeded to reach its own conclusion,
apparently persuaded by the fact that no Pennsylvania case could be found
in which a creditor on a joint debt had attempted to levy upon the interest
of only one spouse.56 Presumably, the Napotnik court believed that the
paucity of such cases indicates that the interests of both spouses are available
to joint creditors and are not "exempt from process" for purposes of section
522(b)(2)(B).
2. Resolution
Both courts purported to reach results compelled by section 522(b)(2)(B).
Unfortunately, the legislative history of section 522 fails to provide clear
guidance as to which result is the correct interpretation of the statute.5 7
51. Id. at 576.
52. 679 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1982).
53. Id. at 318.
54. Id. at 321.
55. Id. at 320.
56. Id. at 321 n.10.
57. In hearings before a House subcommittee, Congressman M. Caldwell Butler, Professor
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, and Bernard Shapiro discussed bankruptcy's effect on the nonbankrupt
spouse's interest in entireties property. Hearings on H.R. 31 Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.,
pt. III (1975-76) [hereinafter cited as Subcommittee Hearings]. Specifically they addressed the
problems caused by the differing treatment of estates by the entirety by the various states. Id.
at 1519-24. The bill before the subcommittee was H.R. 31, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975), the
Bankruptcy Commission's proposed bill, which provided only for federal exemptions by debtors.
The Commission had recommended a flat repeal of the applicability of all state exemption laws
in federal bankruptcy proceedings. BKRTCY. Comm. REPORT, supra note 20, pt. IV at 503 n.3.
In the colloquy, Congressman Butler stated that "[tihe theory of tenancy by the entirety is
that the husband and wife are yet a third person and therefore, if that third person is not in
bankruptcy, [the trustee] should not have an access to that asset." Subcommittee Hearings,
supra, at 1521. In order to remain consistent to this theory then, courts must conclude that a
debtor may exempt his interest in entireties property from the bankruptcy estate.
The Commission's proposal, however, was severely criticized, and such criticism led to the
compromise allowing the option to choose between federal and state exemptions. See, e.g.,
Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 & 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt.
II at 937, 1025, 1663-64 (1975). Therefore, discussion of H.R. 31 may not be an accurate
indication of legislative interest underlying the legislation as enacted.
H.R 31 was succeeded by H.R. 6, 95 Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), which listed an exemption
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However, the relevant policies underlying the Code and entireties property
ownership do provide the necessary guidance.
a. policy considerations
The most significant policy justification for allowing property exemptions
is debtor rehabilitation-to re-establish debtors so that they may once again
participate in the open credit economy.58 This goal is often described as
providing the debtor with a "fresh start."5 9 In order to best serve the "fresh
for "property in which the debtor has an interest as a tenant by the entirety." Id. at 69. Such
language is ambiguous because of the various interpretations which may be given to the interest
of a single debtor in entireties property. On one hand, one could argue that a debtor who co-
owns property as a tenant by the entirety has an undivided interest which allows him to exempt
the property. On the other hand, some bankruptcy courts have decided that a single tenant by
the entirety has no interest, legal or equitable, in entireties property; rather, the fictional marital
unit holds the entire interest. See Ford, 3 Bankr. 559; Trickett, 14 Bankr. 85. Because of the
ambiguity, the language of the exemption in H.R. 6 provides no useful guidance for resolving
the issue.
Most important to the analysis should be the legislative discussion which surrounded the
final version of the Code's exemption section. In a House Report, H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 360-61 (1977), § 522(b) is described as a significant departure from the law
under the 1898 Act because it permits an individual debtor a choice between state and federal
exemptions. There is no discussion, however, of interpretation of the "exempt from process
under applicable nonbankruptcy law" language. See id.; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
75 (1978); 124 CONG. REc. 32,399 (1978); 123 CONG. REc. 33,999 (1977). Without such dis-
cussion, one can only conclude that the legislative history of § 522 provides no definitive basis
for resolving whether a debtor who files singly with joint creditors can exempt his interest in
entireties property.
Finally, one should note that legislative activity which occurred subsequent to adoption of
§ 522 is also not sufficiently clear to resolve the issue. In Napotnik v. Equibank, 679 F.2d
316, the debtor argued that an amendment to § 522(b), proposed subsequent to the section's
adoption, was intended to be a clarification of unarticulated congressional intent. The amend-
ment, if adopted, would have added language to § 522(b)(2) expressly providing that an interest
of a debtor in entireties property would be exempt from property of the bankruptcy estate to
the extent that such interest is exempt under federal law or is not subject to levy by a creditor
of only the debtor under state law. 126 CONG. REc. 31,142 (1980); 126 CONG. REc. 26,488
(1980). In rebuttal, the trustee argued that the Senate had more recently attempted to amend
the Code, but had omitted any amendment of § 522(b). See 127 CONG. REC. S7897 (daily ed.
July 17, 1981). The trustee argued that failure to consider such an amendment indicated that
the earlier proposed amendment presented a substantive change in the law. Napotnik v. Equi-
bank, 679 F.2d at 321 n.11. However, neither of these arguments is conclusive because the
proposed amendment to § 522(b) failed for reasons unrelated to the amendment itself. Id. at
321. See 126 CONG. REc. 31,917 (1980) (indicating that the failure was related to an additional
amendment requiring a debtor's reorganization plan to be confirmed by at least one class of
creditors as a means of adequately differentiating between creditors with impaired claims and
creditors with unimpaired claims).
58. BKRTCY. COMM. REPORT, supra note 20, pt. I at 71.
59. The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of this policy:
[One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is] to relieve the honest
debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh
free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfor-
tunes.
Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915).
This purpose of the [bankruptcy] act has been again and again emphasized by
the courts as being of public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the
honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which
he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field
for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing
debt.
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (emphasis deleted).
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start" policy, relief for debtors must be flexible, comprehensive, lasting, and
timely 0 According to the Bankruptcy Commission, 6' there must be an in-
tegrated system of relief for persons who must continue as income-producing
and consumer spending economic units after bankruptcy.6 2 Based heavily
upon the Commission's recommendations, the Bankruptcy Code has adopted
the approach that the "fresh start" objective will be most readily achieved
by permitting the debtor to retain specified property free from the claims
of creditors.63
A direct result of providing the debtor with a "fresh start," however, is
that creditors suffer. Certainly the exemption laws contribute significantly
to the high percentage of cases in which no assets at all are available for
distribution to creditors. 4 This point raises a second and significant coun-
tervailing policy: distribution of the debtor's assets should yield as much as
possible to satisfy creditors' claims. 65 From the creditors' perspective, it is
important to have bankruptcy rules that determine rights in the debtor's
wealth, wherever situated, and that guide credit in the open-credit economy,
such as processes which permit creditors to realize on their claims.66 To the
extent that debtors' assets are exempt, the assets are not available for liq-
uidation and for the payment of dividends to creditors. 67
A third policy to consider is that of seeking uniformity of bankruptcy
administration results. Congress' adoption of section 522 indicates that uni-
forrrity is not a major concern. Section 522 does not treat all debtors
uniformly because the amount of assets they may claim as exempt depends
upon whether the debtor's state has opted out of the federal exemptions,
60. BKRTCY. Comm. REPORT, supra note 20, pt. I at 79.
61. See supra note 21.
62. BKRTCY. Comm. REPORT, supra note 20, pt. I at 79.
63. See generally Countryman, Consumers in Bankruptcy Cases, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1980).
This approach is in conjunction with granting a debtor a discharge from indebtedness incurred
prior to the filing of the petition.
64. See generally D. STANLEY & M. GmT, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 20-
24 (1971); Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 & 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., Ist & 2d
Sess., pt. II at 768-69 (1975) (statement of Professor Shuchman) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings].
65. BKRTCY. Comm. REPORT, supra note 20, pt. I at 70-80.
66. BKRTCY. Comm. REPORT, supra note 20, pt. I at 71.
67. In fact, the debtor's estate often includes so few assets that creditors have no significant
interest in it. Therefore, denying exemptions to the debtor often benefits the trustee in the
sense that it provides him assets which can be distributed to creditors. See House Hearings,
supra note 64, pt. II at 767, 773, 786-88 (statement of Professor Shuchman). Arguably, Congress'
failure to seriously consider a bankruptcy scheme that would guarantee some minimal dividend
to creditors as a condition to debtors receiving a "fresh start" evidences the lack of importance
of this policy. Previous bankruptcy acts have conditioned allowances of property to the debtor
and the discharge of debts upon the debtor's assets being sufficient to pay 50% of debts owed.
See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 34, 2 Stat. 19; Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176,
§ 33, 14 Stat. 517, as amended by ch. 258, 15 Stat. 227 (1868).
1985]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
leaving the debtor only the nonuniform exemptions provided by state law. 6
However, the constitutional language certainly implies that national uni-
formity is a legitimate goal, 69 and the fact that the Bankruptcy Commission
was created with a view toward eliminating the lack of uniformity in treat-
ment of debtors and creditors70 further supports the implication. Therefore,
despite Congress' adoption of the alternative exemption scheme, the policy
favoring uniformity may provide useful guidance in determining whether a
debtor filing singly may exempt entireties property from joint creditors in
bankruptcy.
Finally, considering the issue in light of one policy which underlies entir-
eties ownership-protection of the marital unit71-may also be helpful. One
judge colorfully articulated the concept of protecting the marital unit:
Husband and wife own an estate in entireties as if it were a living tree,
whose fruits they share together. To split the tree in two would be to
kill it and then it would not be what it was before when either could
enjoy its shelter, shade and fruit as much as the other.72
Arguably, to deny a debtor filing singly an exemption for an interest in
entireties property would, in effect, kill the tree resulting in a lack of shelter
for either spouse. If section 522 is construed without consideration of this
policy, a determination of proper administration of entireties property may
well produce results directly contrary to a fundamental purpose of recog-
nizing entireties ownership.
b. policy application
Interpreting the language in section 522(b)(2)(B) to allow a debtor filing
singly to exempt his interest in entireties property enhances his opportunity
to gain a "fresh start." After discharge, the debtor retains his undivided
interest in the entireties property, which may often be the principal residence
of the debtor and his or her spouse, 73 and is spared the detriment of trying
to relocate in a market of higher prices and mortgage rates. Refusing to
68. See Comment, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE L.J. 1459,
1515-16 (1959) (providing a detailed chart illustrating the disparities throughout the United
States). See also Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERs L.
REv. 678, 681-84 (1960) (providing specific comparisons of disparate treatment of debtors in
various states).
69. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4 reads: "[The Congress shall have the power] [t]o establish
... uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States."
70. BKRTCY. COMM. REPORT, supra note 20, pt. I at 4.
71. Note, The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 and Its Effect Upon Tenancies by the Entireties,
13 IND. L. REV. 761 (1980).
72. Sterrett v. Sterrett, 401 Pa. 583, 585, 166 A.2d 1, 2 (1960).
73. Admittedly, the homestead exemption is specifically designed to protect the family home;
however, it is not unreasonable to conclude that legislatures may see the exemption for entireties
property as an additional protection for the home. See Lavien & Mencher, The Eclipse of
Massachusetts Tenancy by the Entirety and a Reappraisal of Homestead as They Relate to
Bankruptcy, 67 MAss. L. REV. 170, 171 (1982).
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provide the debtor the exemption, however, will likely result in a forced sale
of the entireties property,74 often at deflated values, and will significantly
impair any likelihood of an economic rehabilitation of the debtor. Since the
"fresh start" objective of the Code is aimed at increasing the debtor's value
as an economic unit in society, this policy strongly supports allowing a
debtor filing singly with joint creditors to exempt his interest in entireties
property from the bankruptcy estate.
75
The policy of seeking to maximize the property available to creditors,
while antagonistic to the "fresh start" policy,7 6 does not require denying the
debtor the exemption. Creditors may argue that denying the debtor the
exemption does not necessarily deny him a "fresh start" because state
legislatures are sensitive to those needs when setting state exemption levels.
However, this argument is, at best, transparent because there are great
disparities in state exemption laws, 77 and because legislatures often fail to
modify exemption provisions at reasonable intervals to keep pace with in-
flation .7  Additionally, preventing joint creditors from reaching entireties
property when only one spouse files does not prevent all levying upon such
property. Joint creditors may still do so prior to the debtor's filing date79
in most, if not all, states.80 And, creditors are in a better position to pass
on the costs of any loss in their course of business in a variety of ways:
higher interest rates, tighter controls on the availability of credit, or any
number of methods by which such losses are passed on through the political-
economic system. Certainly creditors are more likely to have this option than
74. See infra note 86 and accompanying text. But see infra note 111 (explaining the statutory
criteria the trustee must meet before sale of estate property).
75. The argument may not seem as convincing in cases where a married couple holds real
estate by the entireties strictly for investment purposes. Whether Congress and state legislatures
view the policy of protecting the marital unit as important enough to allow exemption of
investment property held by the entireties is beyond the scope of this Note.
76. See Grilliot & Yocum, supra note 3, at 348.
77. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
78. For example, in 1855, Massachusetts provided an exemption for tools, implements, and
fixtures necessary for carrying on a trade not exceeding one hundred dollars in value. One
hundred four years later, the exemption was still intact. And, as recently as 1959, Georgia
allowed an exemption of one horse or mule or one yoke of oxen, and one loom and one
spinning wheel. See Joslin, Debtors' Exemption Laws: Time for Modernization, 34 IND. L.J.
355, 356 (1959).
79. Of course, creditors will not be able to levy upon the debtor's property within the 90
days immediately preceding the filing date because the Code prohibits preference of any
unsecured creditor over another unsecured creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982).
80. See, e.g., Fairclaw v. Forrest, 130 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (dictum); Stanley v.
Powers, 123 Fla. 359, 166 So. 843 (1936); Union Nat'l Bank v. Finley, 180 Ind. 470, 103 N.E.
110 (1913); Ades v. Caplan, 132 Md. 66, 103 A. 94 (1918); Rossman v. Hutchinson, 289 Mich.
577, 286 N.W. 835 (1939); Dickey v. Thompson, 323 Mo. 107, 18 S.W.2d 388 (1929); L & M
Gas Co. v. Leggett, 273 N.C. 547, 161 S.E.2d 23 (1968); Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735,
66 S.E.2d 599 (1951). But cf. Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1931) (finding that
the interest of the bankrupt in entireties property does not pass to the trustee for the benefit
of creditors).
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debtors are. For these reasons, providing the debtor an exemption is not
precluded by the policy of maximizing assets available to creditors.
The policy of seeking uniform bankruptcy administration results, by itself,
is not strong enough to justify allowing a debtor filing individually to exempt
his interest in entireties property from joint creditors. However, it does
provide some support for that result. The Supreme Court has held that
"geographical" rather than "personal" uniformity satisfies the constitutional
requirement.8 ' Because section 522 does not specify different administration
results for some states than it does for other states, geographical uniformity
standards are met by an interpretation allowing debtors an exemption. Be-
sides, as noted above, 2 the uniformity policy may not be significant at all
in view of the Code's provision for a choice between state and federal
exemptions.
Finally, the issue should be evaluated in light of the policy underlying
tenancy by the entireties ownership: protection of the marital unit. Intuitively,
it seems that allowing the debtor the exemption would provide maximum
protection for the marriage because there would be no danger of forcing a
sale of the entireties property. Upon reflection, one must reasonably conclude
that in order to be consistent with the policy of protecting the marital unit,
the debtor should be allowed the exemption. Creditors may argue that since
allowing joint creditors to levy on the property is allowed under nonbank-
ruptcy law, 83 denying a debtor who files individually the exemption will only
permit creditors to do what the spouses should reasonably have expected to
happen when they incurred a joint debt. Significantly, this argument ignores
the possibility that creditors could control the extension of credit to spouses
who would own property by the entireties. Indeed, creditors may easily do
so, thereby more directly protecting themselves in the event that one spouse
later files for bankruptcy. Casting this burden upon creditors not only
protects the marital unit by allowing individual debtors to claim the exemp-
tion, but also provides protection by relieving married couples of the re-
sponsibility of familiarizing themselves with the intricacies of modern
bankruptcy law should one of the spouses decide to file.
Providing an exemption for entireties property to a debtor filing individ-
ually with joint creditors will enhance the debtor's "fresh start" without
unduly interfering with creditors' interest in realizing on debts. It is reason-
able to conclude that an interpretation of section 522(b)(2)(B) allowing such
an exemption is the more desirable interpretation. This is especially true
because that conclusion also protects the marital unit which entireties prop-
81. See Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 189 (1902). A federal statute is
geographically uniform whenever it does not require that A be the law in certain states and B
be the law in the remaining states. Comment, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Whether Illinois's Use
of the Federal "Opt-Out" Provision is Constitutional, 1981 S. ILL. L.J. 65, 73.
82. See supra text accompanying note 68.
83. See sources cited supra note 80.
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erty ownership was created to protect and because the constitutional re-
quirement of uniformity will be met by bankruptcy administration results.
II. DEBTOR V. TRUSTEE
Courts also disagree as to the trustee's ability to sell the entireties property
pursuant to section 363(h)84 despite the debtor's exemption claim. 5 The
disagreement arises over whether section 363(h) is even applicable to cases
where the debtor elects to exempt his interest(s) in entireties property.
Several courts have indicated that if an individual files with joint creditors,
then the trustee may sell the entireties property. 6 The view expressed, albeit
in dicta, in In re Cipa8 7 is representative:
Because the debtor's undivided interest in the whole of the entireties
property becomes part of the estate, the entireties property itself becomes
subject to administration. Pursuant to [slection 363(h), the trustee may
sell, subject to certain conditions outlined in 11 U.S.C. § 363(h)(1)-(4),
entireties property without the consent of the non-debtor spouse, even
though the debtor spouse alone would be precluded under state law.S8
Several other courts have concluded that the trustee may not sell the
property. 9 They also have not explained their conclusion in any detail. In
84. 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) reads:
Notwithstanding subsection (0 of this section, the trustee may sell both the
estate's interest, under subsection (b) or (c) of this section, and the interest of
any co-owner in property in which the debtor had, immediately before the com-
mencement of the case, an undivided interest as a tenant in common, joint tenant,
or tenant by the entirety, only if-
(1) partition in kind of such property among the estate and such co-owners
is impracticable;
(2) sale of the estate's undivided interest in such property would realize
significantly less for the estate than sale of such property free of the interests
of such co-owners;
(3) the benefit to the estate of a sale of such property free of the interests
of co-owners outweighs the detriment, if any, to such co-owners; and
(4) such property is not used in the production, transmission, or distri-
bution, for sale, of electric energy or of natural or synthetic gas for heat,
light, or power.
85. Bankruptcy Rules 2002(a), (c)(1), and 6004(a) require that notice of a proposed sale of
property be given to the debtor not less than 20 days before the sale is scheduled to occur
(subject to court approval) and that such notice include the time and place of any public sale,
the terms and conditions of any private sale, and the time fixed for filing objections. Rule
6004(b) then provides that any objection to the proposed sale must be filed not less than five
days before the sale date. If a proper objection is filed, Rule 6004(d) provides for a hearing.
Apparently, it is at this hearing when the bankruptcy court will be required to address the
issue.
86. See In re Phillos, 14 Bankr. 781 (W.D. Va. 1981); In re Korff, 14 Bankr. 189 (E.D.
Mich. 1981); In re Cipa, 11 Bankr. 968 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Chrystler
(In re Trickett), 14 Bankr. 85 (W.D. Mich. 1981); Hadley v. Koehler (In re Koehler), 19 Bankr.
308 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
87. 11 Bankr. 968 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
88. Id. at 971.
89. In re Redmond, 15 Bankr. 437 (E.D. Tenn. 1981); In re Dawson, 10 Bankr. 680, aff'd,
14 Bankr. 822 (E.D. Tenn. 1981); In re Ford, 3 Bankr. 559 (D. Md. 1980); In re Shaw, 5
Bankr. 107 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
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In re Shaw,90 the trustee for the estate of one spouse sought to sell the
property owned by the debtor and her spouse as tenants by the entirety
pursuant to section 363(h). The debtor claimed her interest in the entireties
property as exempt under section 522(b)(2)(B). Since, under Tennessee law,
creditors are able to levy upon the contingent survivorship interest, 9' that
interest was not exemptible. The trustee argued that the right of survivorship
which remained as property of the estate after the section 522(b)(2)(B)
exemption was a sufficient interest in entireties property to entitle sale of
the property pursuant to section 363(h).92
The court rejected the argument, noting that one spouse's right of sur-
vivorship is not an undivided interest in entireties property as specifically
required by section 363(h)(2); rather, it is one which is separate and alien-
able. 93 Although without citing legislative history, the court also stated that
"Congress did not intend to give a trustee for the estate of one spouse the
rather drastic authority to sell the entire property unless the entire interest
of the debtor spouse as tenant by the entirety is included in the estate."94
Similarly, in In re Ford,95 the court concluded that, under Maryland law,
section 363(h) does not become applicable where an individual debtor elects
to exempt his interest in entireties property pursuant to section 522(b)(2)(B). 96
The Ford court noted that its conclusion did not render the statutory pro-
vision meaningless because sale of entireties property would be permissible
in different factual situations and in other jurisdictions. 97
Because the opinions of the courts do not provide a clear explanation of
the trustee's right to sell entireties property, a more comprehensive analysis
will benefit bankruptcy courts and practitioners.
A. The Statute's Ambiguity
In section 363(h), Congress provided that the trustee may sell the interest
of both the estate and the non-debtor spouse, provided that:
(1) partition in kind of such property among the estate and such co-
owners is impracticable;
(2) sale of the estate's undivided interest in such property would realize
significantly less for the estate than sale of such property free of the
interests of such co-owners; [and]
90. 5 Bankr. 107 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
91. Cole Mfg. Co. v. Collier, 95 Tenn. 115, 31 S.W. 1000 (1895).
92. Shaw, 5 Bankr. at 110.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 3 Bankr. 559 (D. Md. 1980).
96. Id. at 578.
97. Id. See infra & supra text accompanying notes 84-113 for a complete discussion of
situations where § 363(h) is applicable.
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(3) the benefit to the estate of a sale of such property free of the
interests of co-owners outweighs the detriment, if any, to such co-owners.98
There are two reasonable, but contradictory, interpretations of this sta-
tutory language. 99 The language could apply whenever the trustee seeks to
sell entireties property. Arguably, if Congress had intended to prevent sales
of entireties property where the debtor was able to exempt all or some of
his interests in entireties property, then it could have done so expressly.
Contrarily, the language could reasonably be interpreted to apply only where
the debtor does not exempt his interests in entireties property under section
522(b)(2)(B). This interpretation would not render the statutory language
meaningless. As noted above,100 the Ford court recognized several situations
in which the trustee may sell entireties property if he can fulfill the statutory
criteria.101
Unfortunately, legislative history provides no guidance as to which inter-
pretation better satisfies congressional intent. 02 However, consideration of
98. There is a fourth limitation in § 363(h) on the right to make a sale. That limitation,
however, was added in an attempt to protect public utilities from being deprived of power
sources because of the bankruptcy of a joint owner. See 124 CONG. Rac. Hi 1093 (daily ed.
Sept. 28, 1978). See supra note 84 for full text of the statute.
99. One might seek to resolve this issue by reading § 363(h) in conjunction with § 522(b)(2)(B).
Section 363(h) only allows the trustee to sell "the estate's interest" in entireties property. See
supra note 84. Section 522(b)(2)(B) provides for the debtor to exempt his interest in entireties
property "from property of the estate." See supra note 47. Thus, one might argue that the
trustee cannot sell entireties property interests pursuant to § 363(h) because, after exemption,
the trustee has no remaining interest to sell. However, this argument incorrectly assumes that
an exemption will be allowed before the trustee proposes to sell the entireties property. See
supra note 85.
100. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
101. See infra note 111.
102. One author has proposed that "[t]he best method of using the legislative history to aid
interpretation of a section of the Code is to begin with the most recent statement of authority
and delve backward through the legislative process." Klee, Legislative History of the New
Bankruptcy Law, 28 DE PAUL L. REv. 941, 957 (1979). Following this method reveals no
mention of § 363(h) more recent than the one in the Senate Report of the Judiciary Committee
to accompany S. 2266 filed by Senator DeConcini on July 14, 1978. S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1978). In that report, subsection (h) is explained in essentially the very
language of the statute:
Subsection (h) permits sale of a co-owner's interest in property in which the debtor
had an undivided ownership interest such as a joint tenancy, a tenancy in common,
or a tenancy by the entirety. Such a sale is permissible only if partition is
impracticable, if sale of the estate's interest would realize significantly less for
the estate that Isic] sale of the property free of the interests of the co-owners,
and if the benefit to the estate of such a sale outweighs any detriment to the co-
owners. This subsection does not apply to a co-owner's interest in a public utility
when a disruption of the utilities services could result.
Accordingly, it provides virtually no guidance on whether the provision is applicable where an
individual debtor exempts his interest in entireties property from the estate under § 522(b)(2)(B).
Similar treatment of § 363(h) is found in an earlier floor statement of Congressman Edwards
and in the House Report of the Judiciary Committee to accompany H.R. 8200. See 124 CONo.
Rc. 473 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Don Edwards); H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
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the relevant policies underlying the Code and entireties property ownership'03
establishes that section 363(h) does not apply when an individual debtor
exempts his interest in entireties property pursuant to section 522(b)(2)(B).
B. Resolution
First, interpreting section 363(h) to be inapplicable where the trustee seeks
to sell exemptible entireties property interests certainly enhances the debtor's
opportunity to gain a "fresh start." Upon receiving a discharge from the
bankruptcy court, the debtor retains his undivided interest in the entireties
property in addition to otherwise exemptible property. Retention produces
more options to a discharged debtor who seeks to reestablish himself as an
income-producing and consumer-spending unit in society. For example, some
debtors are free to borrow money using entireties property interests as
collateral for the loan. The loan proceeds can then be invested to produce
income. Similarly, some debtors may sell the entireties property interests to
attain cash for personal consumption.' 4 Even in jurisdictions where sale of
the interests is not possible, debtors whose principal residence is owned by
the entireties are spared the detriment of trying to relocate. 05 Clearly, dis-
charged debtors have a better opportunity for a "fresh start" with the
entireties asset than without it.
Second, the policy of seeking to maximize the property available to cred-
itors would be promoted by applying section 363(h) to all cases in which
the trustee seeks to sell entireties property. Although such application would
not always allow a sale, 1' 6 it would increase the likelihood of one. However,
allowing sale under section 363(h) and thereby defeating the exemption
expressly provided by section 522(b)(2)(B) is unreasonable. Under the alter-
native interpretation, section 363(h) serves the "fresh start" policy and does
not render the exemption provision useless. 07 Furthermore, interpreting sec-
tion 363(h) as inapplicable does not deny creditors all effective relief, because
they may still recover prior to bankruptcy in most, if not all, states08 and
because creditors are in a better position to pass on the costs of any loss
in their course of business.1' 9 Therefore, while creditor satisfaction would
be enhanced by applying section 363(h) to all cases, this policy is better
served by interpreting section 363(h) as inapplicable where an individual
debtor seeks to exempt his interest in entireties property.
103. See supra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
104. See infra note 114 (indicating that of the five jurisdictional forms of entireties property
ownership, four allow debtors to convey at least some of their interests).
105. See infra note 141 for a list of these jurisdictions.
106. See infra note III and accompanying text.
107. A statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative. Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979).
108. See supra note 80.
109. See supra text accompanying note 80.
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Third, in view of the Code's provision for a choice between state and
federal exemptions," 0 the policy of seeking uniform bankruptcy administra-
tion results, by itself, is not strong enough to prefer one interpretation over
the other. However, interpreting section 363(h) as inapplicable to exemptible
entireties property interests is consistent with the constitutional uniformity
standard. This interpretation produces differing results only to the extent
that certain states allow debtors to exempt their interests in entireties property
while others do not. Section 363(h) does not specify that bankruptcy admin-
istration results differ in various states; states are free to amend their property
law to achieve any beneficial results allowable under the terms of section
363(h).
Moreover, interpreting the statute to allow sale despite the exemption
would not necessarily provide more uniformity. The administration results
will still depend on whether the trustee can fulfill the three statutory crite-
ria."' The facts of each case could produce differing results within states,
whereas the suggested interpretation would only produce different results
among states." 2
110. See supra note 57.
111. See supra note 84. Only one of the three criteria which are relevant to entireties property
ownership presents a problem for trustees. The first criterion will almost always be met when
the property which the trustee seeks to sell is owned by the entireties. That is, in nearly every
jurisdiction recognizing entireties ownership, partition of the property is impracticable because
the incidents of entireties ownership do not allow alienation by an individual spouse of all of
his or her interests. See infra note 114. In those few jurisdictions where partition is practicable
(Alaska, Arkansas, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon), sale by the trustee will not be allowed.
The second criteri6n is also not particularly difficult for a trustee to meet when he seeks to
sell entireties property. Sale of the estate's undivided interest in entireties property is likely to
be difficult, if not impossible, because of the non-debtor spouse's indestructible right of
survivorship. Grilliot & Yocum, supra note 3, at 348. Free of the co-owning spouse's interest,
however, the property could be sold for its fair market value. Though § 363(j) requires the
trustee to distribute to the debtor's spouse the proceeds, less the costs and expenses, of such
sale according to the interests of such spouse, the amount of proceeds left to the estate would
most likely exceed the amount the trustee could get from a sale of the debtor's undivided
interest.
The third criterion is the difficult one for the trustee to meet in order to allow sale of the
entireties property. The benefit to the estate of such a sale is illustrated clearly by the discussion
of the second criterion above. However, the difficulty will arise when the trustee tries to
establish that the benefit outweighs the detriment to the non-debtor spouse. The court, arguably,
will be forced to consider factors such as the relative ages of the debtor and the joint owner
and, if residential property is involved, the costs of relocation for the non-debtor spouse.
Evaluation of these factors involves calculation of various potential risks to be borne by non-
debtor spouses. Courts may be unwilling to make such calculations, not only because of the
unreliablility of risk measurement, but also because the evaluation process could be seen as
shifting some of the burden of establishing the statutory criteria from the trustee to the non-
debtor spouse.
112. For example, assume two married couples living in the same jurisdiction. Each couple
owns a home by the entireties. Each couple has joint creditors. Couple A has 10 children;
couple B has no children. The husband of each couple files for bankruptcy and seeks to exempt
his interests in the entireties property. A bankruptcy court could very well decide to allow the
trustee to sell couple B's house but not to allow sale of couple A's house. The detriment to
wife A of relocating with 10 children could be found by a court to outweigh the benefit to
the estate of selling the home. While this example oversimplifies the factors the court will
consider, it demonstrates that allowing sale despite a debtor's exemption claim will not nec-
essarily produce uniform bankruptcy administration results.
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Finally, to protect the marital unit, section 363(h) should not be applied
where an individual debtor seeks to exempt his interest(s) in entireties prop-
erty. This interpretation reduces the circumstances in which the trustee can
sell the entireties property. As a result, married couples who own homes by
the entireties will not be required to bear the burden of relocating in a
market of higher prices and mortgage rates. Furthermore, spouses will not
be forced into the bankruptcy process by an involuntary sale of entireties
property. Strain on marriages is certainly reduced by an interpretation which
does not force the non-debtor spouse to suffer directly from a forced sale
of his or her entireties property interests which were not part of the bank-
ruptcy estate." 3
In sum, interpreting section 363(h) as inapplicable where a debtor exempts
his interest in entireties property is more likely to ensure the debtor a "fresh
start" and to protect the marital unit. Moreover, this interpretation does
not allow the trustee to defeat exemption rights which are expressly provided
to the debtor in section 522(b)(2)(B). Because this alternative is less offensive
to the other provisions of the Code and satisfies the policies underlying the
Code and entireties property ownership, it is the correct interpretation of
section 363(h).
III. BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION RESULTS
Having resolved the questions above, it is now possible to summarize the
results of administering entireties property in each of the five groups of
jurisdictions ' 4 as defined by the incidents of the estate and as affected by
113. It has been argued that § 363(i) and § 3630) provide the necessary protection to a non-
debtor spouse by providing a right of first purchase or, alternatively, a right to proceeds from
the sale according to the interests held by the non-debtor spouse. See In re Cipa, I 1 Bankr.
968 (W.D. Pa. 1981); In re Trickett, 14 Bankr. 85 (W.D. Mich. 1981). Correspondingly, the
benefit of sale will always outweigh the detriment to the non-debtor spouse. However, to accept
this argument would be to effectively nullify the third criterion in § 363(h). Such a construction
is contrary to general rules of statutory construction and is unnecessary. See Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979).
114. (1) North Carolina is the only state which has retained the husband's right to exclusive
control of the usufruct (the present enjoyment of all of the use, possession, and income from
the entireties property). The husband alone is entitled to convey the usufruct during coverture,
but he may not convey his contingent right of survivorship. Individual creditors of the husband
may levy on the usufruct, but not on the contingent right of survivorship. See sources cited
infra notes 116-28.(2) Massachusetts and Michigan are similar to each other in that the usufruct is split between
the husband and wife and in that either spouse may convey the usufruct or the contingent right
of survivorship. In Michigan, individual creditors may not levy on the usufruct or the contingent
right of survivorship; however, in Massachusetts, individual creditors may not levy on those
incidents only where the entireties property involved is the principal residence of the debtor.
See sources cited infra notes 129-40.(3) The majority of jurisdictions which still recognize tenancies by the entirety split the
usufruct equally between husband and wife, prohibit conveyance of any interest in the property
by either spouse, and prohibit individual creditors from levying on either the usufruct or the
contingent right of survivorship. See sources cited infra notes 141-50. See also infra note 141
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the number of debtors filing and by the type of creditors involved where
the petitioner has elected to take state exemptions." 5
A. Group 1-North Carolina
1. Incidents of Entireties Ownership
North Carolina is the only state which has retained the husband's exclusive
right to control of the usufruct-the present enjoyment of all of the use,
possession and income from the entireties property.'1 6 The husband alone is
entitled to convey the usufruct during coverture, but he may not convey his
contingent right of survivorship." 7 Individual creditors of the husband may
levy on the usufruct, but not on the contingent right of survivorship." 8 The
wife may convey nothing and her individual creditors may not levy on her
individual interests.' '9
2. Exemptibility of Interests in Entireties Property
A spouse who files singly for bankruptcy could have either individual or
joint creditors (or both). In those cases where the debtor-husband files with
individual creditors, his interest in the usufruct is not exempt under section
522(b)(2)(B) because it is not exempt from levy by individual creditors under
(listing the states within this category).
(4) Kentucky and Tennessee also split the usufruct between husband and wife. Neither spouse
may convey the usufruct, but either may convey his or her contingent right of survivorship.
Likewise, no individual creditors may levy on the usufruct, but they may levy upon the contingent
survivorship interest. See sources cited infra notes 156-61.
(5) In Alaska, Arkansas, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon, the usufruct is split equally
between spouses. Either spouse may convey the usufruct and/or the contingent right of sur-
vivorship. Creditors of either spouse may levy on the usufruct and/or the contingent right of
survivorship. In these states, tenancy by the entirety is the practical equivalent of a tenancy in
common for the joint lives of spouses, with an indestructible remainder interest in the surviving
spouse. See sources cited infra notes 162-74.
115. See infra Appendix for a chart summarizing proper administration results in each of
the five groups of jurisdictions.
116. See Williams v. Williams, 231 N.C. 33, 56 S.E.2d 20 (1949); Atkinson v. Atkinson,
225 N.C. 120, 33 S.E.2d 666 (1945); Lewis v. Pate, 212 N.C. 253, 193 S.E. 20 (1937); Moore
v. Shore, 208 N.C. 446, 181 S.E. 275 (1935); Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188
(1927); Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 124 S.E. 566 (1924); Dorsey v. Kirkland, 177 N.C. 520,
99 S.E. 407 (1919); Bank of Greenville v. Gornto, 161 N.C. 341, 77 S.E. 222 (1913); West v.
Railroad, 140 N.C. 620, 53 S.E. 477 (1906); Bynum v. Wicker, 141 N.C. 95, 53 S.E. 478
(1906).
117. Cases cited supra note 116.
118. L & M Gas Co. v. Leggett, 273 N.C. 547, 161 S.E.2d 23 (1968). Though creditors may
levy on the usufruct, Leggett also indicates that the husband and wife could convey free of
the severed interest. Therefore, the creditor's ability to levy is somewhat illusory. But cf. Stubbs
v. Hardee, 461 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1972) (holding that an attempt to retain equitable ownership
of the land and of accruing profits, both free of the claims of creditors, was a violation of
creditors' rights).
119. See cases cited supra note 116.
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state law. However, his contingent right of survivorship is exempt, as is a
debtor-wife's interest in the contingent right of survivorship. These results
are consistent with the Code's provision that one looks to applicable non-
bankruptcy law for determining exemptions.' 20
If a spouse files singly with joint creditors, the results are slightly different.
Because this Note argues that joint creditors cannot reach the debtor's
undivided interest in bankruptcy, it makes no difference that under North
Carolina law, joint creditors can execute upon entireties property outside
bankruptcy.' 2' When a spouse files singly for bankruptcy, the individual's
interest in entireties property can be declared exempt, even in the presence
of joint creditors. Such creditors will have to seek to recover on the joint
debt prior to the bankruptcy filing122 or will have to file an involuntary
petition to force the other spouse into bankruptcy. 23 If the latter alternative
is sought, the creditor will then need to seek consolidation of the debtors'
bankruptcy cases' 24 in order to reach the entireties property.
In cases where both spouses file for bankruptcy, it is also possible for
there to be individual or joint creditors. If the joint debtors have only
individual creditors, then the results should be the same for each debtor as
if each spouse had filed alone. 25 Where both spouses file with joint creditors,
the entireties property is subject to administration by the trustee and cannot
be exempted by either or both of the spouses.
3. Sale of the Entireties Property
The trustee may not sell the entireties property where either (1) the husband
or the wife files singly with individual or joint creditors, or (2) both debtors
file but with individual creditors. These results are generally compelled by
the conclusion that any undivided interest in entireties property which is
exemptible prevents the trustee from being able to sell the entireties prop-
erty. 26 The exception occurs where the husband files individually with in-
dividual creditors. Although his interest in the usufruct is not exemptible
120. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1982). See supra note 10.
121. Martin v. Lewis, 187 N.C. 473, 122 S.E. 180 (1924).
122. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
123. The provisions regulating the commencement of an involuntary case are set forth in 11
U.S.C. § 303 (1982).
124. 11 U.S.C. § 302(B) (1982) provides for the court to determine which cases shall be
consolidated. The factors that will be relevant in the court's determination include the extent
of jointly owned property and the amount of jointly owned debts. The section is not license
to consolidate cases in order to avoid other provisions of the Code to the detriment of either
the debtors or their creditors. It is designed mainly for ease of administration. S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). See also D'Avignon v. Palmisano, 34 Bankr. 796 (D. Vt.
1982) (holding that joint administration of separate petitions could defeat the exemption).
125. See supra text accompanying note 120.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 84-113.
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from the estate, it is not an undivided interest as required by section
363(h)(2);127 therefore, the trustee is not entitled to sell the entireties property.
The trustee may sell the entireties property where both spouses file with
joint creditors, if he can establish the three statutory criteria. This result is
compelled by the debtors' inability to exempt their undivided interests in the
entireties property from the estate pursuant to section 522(b)(2)(B).'22
B. Group 2-Michigan, Massachusetts
1. Incidents of Entireties Ownership
In these states, the usufruct 129 is split equally between husband and wife. 30
In addition, either spouse may convey his or her interest in the usufruct
and/or his or her contingent right of survivorship.' 3' In Michigan, individual
creditors of either spouse may not levy on that spouse's interests;3 2 but, in
Massachusetts, the protection against levy by individual creditors extends
only to entireties property which is the principal residence of the debtor(s).,33
2. Exemptibility of Interests in Entireties Property
In Michigan, since individual creditors may not levy on entireties property
outside bankruptcy, where one or both spouses file but with only individual
creditors, the entireties property is exemptible from administration. The result
would be the same in these instances in Massachusetts as long as the property
involved is a principal residence of the debtor(s). 34 Entireties property which
is not such a residence is, however, subject to administration and distribution
to creditors.
127. That is, the incidents of entireties property ownership in North Carolina are such that
the husband has exclusive rights to control of the usufruct. It is not an undivided interest.
Because § 363(h)(2) provides that the trustee may sell the property only if the sale of the estate's
undivided interest in entireties property would realize significantly less for the estate than sale
of the entireties property free of co-owners' interests, a debtor-husband filing individually in
North Carolina cannot subject the entireties property co-owned with his wife to sale by the
trustee.
128. One should note two other situations in which the trustee can sell the entireties property,
if the statutory criteria are met. These situations are: (1) where a debtor does not elect his
state exemptions; rather he elects to take the federal exemptions under § 522(b)(1), and (2)
where a debtor does not elect to take any exemptions. In re Ford, 3 Bankr. 559, 578 (D. Md.
1980).
129. See supra text accompanying note 116.
130. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209, § I (West 1979); MicH. CoMP. LAws § 557.71 (West
Supp. 1984-85).
131. Sources cited infra note 135.
132. Banker's Trust Co. v. Humber, 264 Mich. 71, 249 N.W. 454 (1933); Moore v. Van
Goosen, 250 Mich. 67, 229 N.W. 451 (1930); Hoyt v. Winstanley, 221 Mich. 515, 191 N.W.
213 (1922); Dickey v. Converse, 117 Mich. 449, 76 N.W. 80 (1898).
133. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209, § 1 (West 1979).
134. See id.
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If both spouses filed with joint creditors, the entireties property remains
property of the bankruptcy estate, because under either state's law, entireties
property is subject to execution for the joint debts of spouses outside bank-
ruptcy.3 5 However, if only one spouse files with joint creditors,'36 he or she
is entitled to exempt the undivided interest in entireties property in Michigan
or in Massachusetts.
3. Sale of the Entireties Property
a. Michigan
The trustee may not sell the entireties property where either (1) the debtor
files singly with individual or joint creditors, or (2) both debtors file but
with individual creditors. These results are compelled by the conclusion that
any undivided interest in entireties property which is exemptible prevents the
trustee from being able to sell the entireties property. 37
The trustee may sell the entireties property where both spouses file with
joint creditors, if he can establish the three statutory criteria. This result is
compelled by the debtors' inability to exempt their undivided interests in the
entireties property from the estate pursuant to section 522(b)(2)(B).'38
b. Massachusetts
The trustee may sell the entireties property where either (1) the debtor
files singly with individual or joint creditors, or (2) both debtors file with
individual creditors, but he may do so only if he can establish the three
statutory criteria and if the entireties property is not the principal residence
of the debtor(s). If the entireties property is the principal residence, then
the undivided interest of the debtor(s) in the property is exemptible and will
prevent the trustee from selling the property. 3 9
The trustee may sell the entireties property where both spouses file with
joint creditors, if he can satisfy the three statutory criteria, regardless of
whether the property is a principal residence. This result is compelled by
the debtors' inability to exempt their undivided interests in the entireties
property from the estate pursuant to section 522(b)(2)(B).14 °
135. MICH. Cou'. LAws ANN. § 557.53 (West Supp. 1984-85); see Lavien & Mencher, supra
note 73, at 175.
136. See, e.g., Total Leonard, Inc. v. locco (In re locco), I Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CCR) 943
(E.D. Mich. 1975); In re Trickett, 14 Bankr. 85 (W.D. Mich. 1981).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 84-113.
138. See supra note 128.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 84-113.
140. See supra note 128.
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C. Group 3-The Majority Jurisdictions
1. Incidents of Entireties Ownership
This group includes the majority of states that retain tenancy by the
entirety as a form of property ownership.' 41 These states split the usufruct 42
equally between husband and wife, 43 prohibit conveyance of any interest in
the property by either spouse,' 44 and prohibit individual creditors from lev-
ying on either the usufruct or the contingent right of survivorship. 145
2. Exemptibility of Interests in Entireties Property
Where one or both spouses file with only individual creditors, it is clear
that entireties property will not be subject to administration. 46 This is con-
sistent with the state law incidents prohibiting individual creditors from
levying on entireties property. Again, the conflict occurs where a spouse
files singly but with joint creditors. 47 Section 522(b)(2)(B) should be inter-
preted to require both spouses to file for bankruptcy if joint creditors are
to be able to reach entireties property, so that all of the undivided interests
in the entireties property would be available for administration. Where both
141. Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Vermont, Virgin Islands, Virginia, and Wyoming. See supra note 114 (sum-
marizing the incidents of entireties ownership in these jurisdictions).
142. See supra text accompanying note 116.
143. Hoyle v. Hoyle, 66 A.2d 130 (Del. Ch. 1949); Fairclaw v. Forrest, 130 F.2d 829 (D.C.
Cir. 1942); Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925); Fuqua v. Merchants Loan & Say.
Ass'n, 114 Ind. App. 607, 54 N.E.2d 287 (1944) (by inference); Masterman v. Masterman, 129
Md. 167, 98 A. 537 (1916); Schwind v. O'Halloran, 346 Mo. 486, 142 S.W.2d 55 (1940);
Wickerham v. Vitori, 345 Pa. 111, 25 A.2d 801 (1942); Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R.I. 452, 25
A.2d 354 (1942) (dictum); Sargent v. Platt, 111 Vt. 185, 13 A.2d 195 (1940); Masonry Prods.,
Inc. v. Tees, 280 F. Supp. 654 (D. St. Croix 1968); Burroughs v. Gorman, 166 Va. 58, 184
S.E. 174 (1936); Peters v. Dona, 49 Wyo. 306, 54 P.2d 817 (1936) (by inference).
144. Citizens Say. Bank v. Astrin, 61 A.2d 419 (Del. Super. 1948); Fairclaw, 130 F.2d 829;
Bailey, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833; Baker v. Cailor, 206 Ind. 440, 186 N.E. 769 (1933); Keen v.
Keen, 60 A.2d 200 (Md. 1948) (dictum); Wilson v. Fower, 236 Mo. App. 532, 155 S.W.2d
502 (1941); Schweitzer v. Evans, 360 Pa. 552, 63 A.2d 39 (1949); Bloomfield, 67 R.I. 452, 25
A.2d 354 (dictum); Kennedy v. Rutter, 110 Vt. 332, 6 A.2d 17 (1939); Masonry Prods., 280
F. Supp. 654; Allen v. Parkey, 154 Va. 739, 149 S.E. 615 (1929); Peters, 49 Wyo. 306, 54
P.2d 817 (by inference).
145. Citizens Say. Bank, 61 A.2d 419; Fairclaw, 130 F.2d 829; Dodson v. Nat'l Title Ins.
Co., 159 Fla. 371, 31 So. 2d 402 (1947); Baker, 206 Ind. 440, 186 N.E. 769; Keen, 60 A.2d
200 (dictum); Baker v. Lamar, 140 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. 1940); Amadon v. Amadon, 359 Pa. 434,
59 A.2d 135 (1948); Bloomfield, 67 R.I. 452, 25 A.2d 354 (dictum); Corey v. McLean, 100
Vt. 90, 135 A. 10 (1926); Masonry Prods., 280 F. Supp. 654; Allen, 154 Va. 739, 149 S.E.
615; Peters, 49 Wyo. 306, 54 P.2d 817 (dictum).
146. For cases where one spouse files, see Greenblatt v. Fbrd, 638 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1981);
Kosto v. Lausch (In re Lausch), 16 Bankr. 162 (M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Lunger, 14 Bankr. 6
(M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Sutton, 10 Bankr. 737 (E.D. Va. 1981); In re Ford, 3 Bankr. 559 (D.
Md. 1980); Bass v. Thacker (In re Thacker), 5 Bankr. 592 (W.D. Va. 1980); and where both
spouses file, see In re Lambert, 10 Bankr. 11 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
147. See supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
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spouses do file with joint creditors in these states, no interests in entireties
property are exemptible. 1
48
3. Sale of the Entireties Property
The trustee may not sell the entireties property where either (1) the debtor
files singly with individual or joint creditors, or (2) both debtors file but
with individual creditors. These results are compelled by the conclusion that
any undivided interest in entireties property which is exemptible prevents the
trustee from being able to sell the entireties property. 49
The trustee may sell the entireties property where both spouses file with
joint creditors, if he can establish the three statutory criteria. This result is
compelled by the debtors' inability to exempt their undivided interests in the
entireties property from the estate pursuant to section 522(b)(2)(B).' 50
D. Group 4-Kentucky, Tennessee
1. Incidents of Entireties Ownership
Group four states, Kentucky and Tennessee, split the usufruct", equally
between husband and wife. 5 2 Neither spouse may convey the usufruct, 53
but either may convey the contingent right of survivorship. 5 4 Likewise, no
individual creditors may levy on the usufruct,151 but they may levy upon the
contingent survivorship interest. 56 In these states, administration of entireties
property in bankruptcy should produce the following results.
148. See Ragsdale v. Genesco, Inc., 674 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Ragsdale, 9 Bankr.
991 (E.D. Va. 1981); In re Butler, 5 Bankr. 360 (D. Md. 1980).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 84-113.
150. See supra note 128.
151. See supra text accompanying note 116.
152. Hoffmann v. Newell, 249 Ky. 270, 60 S.W.2d 607 (1932); Williams v. Cravens, 28
Tenn. App. 541, 191 S.W.2d 942 (1946).
153. Francis v. Vastine, 229 Ky. 431, 17 S.W.2d 419 (1929); Sloan v. Sloan, 182 Tenn. 162,
184 S.W.2d 391 (1945).
154. Sources cited supra note 153.
155. Hoffmann, 249 Ky. 270, 60 S.W.2d 607; Cole Mfg. Co. v. Collier, 95 Tenn. 115, 31
S.W. 1000 (1895). But see Ames v. Norman, 36 Tenn. 369 (4 Sneed) (1857) (holding that
individual creditors may levy upon the estate, but noting that purchasers at sale will hold in
subordination to the contingent survivorship interest of the non-debtor spouse).
156. Sources cited supra note 155. The significant aspect of the ability of a creditor to levy
on the contingent right of survivorship is that an intervening conveyance will not defeat the
creditor's right to take the property if the debtor spouse is the survivor, even if the property
is in the hands of a third party. At least one case in Kentucky has held that the usufruct
interest can be levied upon. In re Brown, 60 F.2d 269 (W.D. Ky. 1932). In that case, the
trustee was allowed to sell the entire usufruct for the joint lives of the bankrupt and spouse.
Half of the proceeds passed to the bankrupt estate and half to the non-debtor spouse. But cf.
United States v. Ragsdale, 206 F. Supp. 613 (W.D. Tenn. 1962). That court acknowledged the
rule that only the contingent right of survivorship could be levied upon by the individual
creditor. However, because the entirety was in cash proceeds from the sale of an entirety, the
court ordered the money invested in United States bonds and one-half of the interest was to
be paid to the creditor and one-half to the non-debtor spouse. The principal of the bonds
would pass to the creditor or to the non-debtor spouse, depending upon whether the debtor
was the survivor.
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2. Exemptibility of Interests in Entireties Property
Where a single spouse or both spouses file with only individual creditors,
courts should rule that the debtor(s) can exempt all but the survivorship
interest(s).5 7 Presence of joint creditors when both spouses file will result
in the entireties property being subject to administration. Where only one
spouse files with joint creditors, the debtor's undivided interest in the usufruct
and in the contingent right of survivorship should be allowed as an exemp-
tion, since state law requires both of the debtor's interests to be present for
joint creditors to levy. 8
3. Sale of the Entireties Property
The trustee may not sell the entireties property where either (1) the debtor
files singly with individual or joint creditors, or (2) both debtors file but
with individual creditors. Where joint creditors are involved, the result is
compelled by the conclusion that any undivided interest in entireties property
which is exemptible prevents the trustee from being able to sell the entireties
property. 59 Although either spouse's individual contingent survivorship in-
terest is not exemptible from the estate where either spouse files or both
spouses file with individual creditors, it is not an undivided interest as
required by section 363(h)(2);160 therefore, the trustee is not entitled to sell
the entireties property.
The trustee may sell the entireties property where both spouses file with
joint creditors, if he can establish the three statutory criteria. This result is
compelled by the debtors' inablility to exempt their undivided interests in
the entireties property from the estate pursuant to section 522(b)(2)(B).' 6'
E. Group 5-Alaska, Arkansas,
New Jersey, New York, Oregon
1. Incidents of Entireties Ownership
The final group of states 62 includes Alaska, Arkansas, New Jersey, New
York, and Oregon. In these states, tenancy by the entirety is the practical
equivalent of a tenancy in common for the joint lives of the spouses, with
157. See, e.g., In re Dawson, 10 Bankr. 680 (E.D. Tenn. 1981); In re Redmond, 15 Bankr.
437 (E.D. Tenn. 1981); In re Shaw, 5 Bankr. 107 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
158. Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626, 632 (Tenn. 1974).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 84-113.
160. See supra note 127.
161. See supra note 128.
162. One should note that Hawaii, Mississippi, and Oklahoma have not been classified within
one of the five groups because of the uncertainty of the incidents of entireties property ownership
within these jurisdictions.
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an indestructible remainder interest in the surviving spouse. 63 The usufruct' 64
is split equally between husband and wife. 65 Either spouse may convey the
usufruct and/or the contingent right of survivorship,'6 and individual cred-
itors may levy on the usufruct and/or the contingent right of survivorship.' 67
2. Exemptibility of Interests in Entireties Property
Where a spouse files singly with only individual creditors, 6s entireties
property will not be exemptible because it would have been subject to levy
outside bankruptcy. State law clearly permits a debtor's interest in a tenancy
by the entirety to be sold under execution upon a judgment against that
debtor.'9 The purchaser at such sale becomes a tenant in common with the
debtor's spouse, subject to the spouse's right of survivorship, and is entitled
to share in the rents and profits, but not in the occupancy. 170 If both spouses
file with individual creditors, the purchasers at sale apparently become ten-
ants in common with each other.' 7'
Where both spouses file with joint creditors, the entireties property would
not be exemptible because, under state law, the property would be subject
to execution by joint creditors. 72 A debtor who files individually with joint
creditors, however, could exempt his or her undivided interest based upon
163. Phipps, supra note 2, at 31.
164. See supra text accompanying note 116.
165. Pilip v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 397 (D. Alaska 1960) (declaring the incidents to
be those found in Oregon); Davies v. Johnson, 124 Ark. 390, 187 S.W. 323 (1916); Schulz v.
Ziegler, 80 N.J. Eq. 199, 83 A. 968 (1912); In re Jamaica Bay, 252 A.D. 103, 297 N.Y.S. 415
(1937); Pfaffinger v. Seely, 134 Or. 542, 291 P. 1015 (1930). But cf. 4 R. POWELL, Tm LAW
OF REAL PROPERTY § 623 (1982) (concluding that entireties ownership does not exist in Alaska).
166. Pilip, 186 F. Supp. 397; Pope v. McBride, 207 Ark. 940, 184 S.W.2d 259 (1944);
Zanzonico v. Zanzonico, 24 N.J. Misc. 15, 46 A.2d 565 (1946); Kawalis v. Kawalis, 183 Misc.
896, 53 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Marshall v. Wilson, 175 Or. 506, 154 P.2d 547 (1945).
New Jersey differs slightly from the other states in this group in that only the husband may
convey his right of survivorship, as well as his joint interest, during marriage. And, he may
do so only to his wife. Schumann v. Curry, 121 N.J. Eq. 439, 190 A. 628 (1937).
167. Pilip, 186 F. Supp. 397; Moore v. Denson, 167 Ark. 134, 268 S.W. 609 (1924);
Zanzonico, 24 N.J. Misc. 15, 46 A.2d 565 (explaining that the debtor's contingent right of
survivorship does not pass, and if such debtor survives his or her spouse, he or she will take
free of the title of the purchaser at the execution sale); Infante v. Sperber, 187 Misc. 9, 61
N.Y.S.2d 76, rev'd on other grounds, 271 A.D. 896, 67 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1946); Bush v. Shepherd,
186 Or. 105, 205 P.2d 842 (1949).
168. See, e.g., In re Weiss, 4 Bankr. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
169. Sources cited supra note 167.
170. Rothschild v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 212 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1954); In re Rowe,
234 F. Supp. 114 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N.Y. 306, 39 N.E. 337 (1895); Finnegan
v. Humes, 252 A.D. 385, aff'd, 277 N.Y. 682, 14 N.E.2d 389 (1938).
Significantly, the purchaser at sale cannot maintain a partition action. Bartkowaik v. Sampson,
73 Misc. 446, 133 N.Y.S. 401 (Oneida County Ct. 1911).
171. Rents and profits are, of course, more easily shared than possession would be if the
entireties property involves a dwelling. In cases which involve dwellings, the cotenants may be
forced to seek partition of the estate. Generally, partition is an inherent right of tenants in
common. Albin v. Albin, 26 Misc. 2d 383, 208 N.Y.S.2d 252 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
172. Hiles, 144 N.Y. at 315, 39 N.E. at 339 (citing McCurdy v. Cannin, 64 Pa. 39 (1870)).
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the argument that outside bankruptcy a joint creditor could only levy on
entireties property when both spouses' interests were available.
3. Sale of the Entireties Property
The trustee may not sell the entireties property where the debtor files
singly with joint creditors. This result is compelled by the conclusion that
any undivided interest in entireties property which is exemptible prevents the
trustee from being able to sell the entireties property.
73
The trustee may sell the entireties property where either (1) a spouse files
singly or both spouses file with individual creditbrs, or (2) where both spouses
file with joint creditors, if he can establish the statutory criteria. In each of
these situations, an undivided interest in entireties property was property of
the estate which could not be exempted pursuant to section 522(b)(2)(B). 174
CONCLUSION
Administration of entireties property in bankruptcy causes courts consid-
erable difficulty. The legislative history of section 541 of the Bankruptcy
Code provides persuasive support for the conclusion that entireties property
does become property of the bankruptcy estate. However, the legislative
history of section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Code is neither persuasive nor even
helpful in determining whether a debtor who files individually with joint
creditors and who elects to take state exemptions may exempt his or her
interest in entireties property from the bankruptcy estate. Policies underlying
the Code and entireties property ownership, however, provide ample support
for the conclusion that a debtor should be entitled to exempt entireties
property.
Similarly, these policies support interpreting section 363(h) to be inappli-
cable where a trustee seeks to sell entireties property despite the debtor's
ability to exempt his interest(s) in the property under section 522(b)(2)(B).
While these results may seem too great a burden to place on creditors and
the open-credit economy in modern society, to conclude otherwise would be
to unreasonably construe the statutory language and to defeat the purpose
of entireties property ownership.
If Congress seeks to deny debtors who file individually the exemption or
to allow trustees to sell entireties property despite the exemption, it should
expressly do so. Likewise, state legislatures who do not support the underlying
policy of tenancies by the entirety should repeal statutes allowing creation
of that estate.
RODGER A. HEATON
173. See supra text accompanying notes 84-113.
174. See supra note 128.
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Appendix
Group 1-North Carolina
Individual Creditors
Debtor Files
Singly
Debtors File
Jointly or File
Separately but are
Consolidated
Group 2-Michigan,
Debtor Files
Singly
Joint Creditors
Husband's interest in All of debtor's
the usufruct is not interests in entireties
exemptible. Husband's property are
or wife's contingent exemptible. Trustee
right of survivorship is may not sell the
exemptible. Trustee entireties property.
may not sell the
entireties property.
Results are the same No interests in
for each debtor as if entireties property are
each had filed singly. exemptible. Trustee
may sell the entireties
property if he can
meet the statutory
criteria.
Massachusetts
Individual Creditors Joint Creditors
Mich.-Entireties All of debtor's
interests are interests in entireties
exemptible. Trustee property are exemptible
may not sell the in either state. In
entireties property. Michigan, trustee may
Mass.-Only entireties not sell the entireties
interests in property property. In
which is a principal Massachusetts, trustee
residence of the debtor may sell the entireties
is exemptible. Trustee property if 1) he can
may sell the entireties meet the statutory
property if 1) he can criteria, and 2) the
meet the statutory entireties property is
criteria, and 2) the not the debtor's
entireties property is principal residence.
not the debtor's
principal residence.
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Debtors File
Jointly or File
Separately but are
Consolidated
Results are the same
for each debtor as if
each had filed singly.
No interests in
entireties property are
exemptible. Trustee
may sell the entireties
property if he can
meet the statutory
criteria.
Group 3-Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Indiana, Maryland,
Missouri, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virgin
Islands, Virginia, Wyoming
Debtor Files
Singly
Debtors File
Jointly or File
Separately but are
Consolidated
Group 4-Kentucky,
Debtor Files
Singly
Debtors File
Jointly or File
Separately but are
Consolidated
Individual Creditors
All of debtor's
interests in entireties
property are
exemptible. Trustee
may not sell the
entireties property.
Joint Creditors
Results are the same No interests in
for each debtor as if entireties property are
each had filed singly. exemptible. Trustee
may sell the entireties
property if he can
meet the statutory
criteria.
Tennessee
Individual Creditors Joint Creditors
Debtor's interest in All of debtor's
usufruct is exemptible. interests in entireties
Debtor's interest in property are
contingent right of exemptible. Trustee
survivorship is not may not sell the
exemptible. Trustee entireties property.
may not sell the
entireties property.
Results are the same No interests in
for each debtor as if entireties property are
each had filed singly. exemptible. Trustee
may sell the entireties
property if he can
meet the statutory
criteria.
All of debtor's
interests in entireties
property are
exemptible. Trustee
may not sell the
entireties property.
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Group 5-Alaska, Arkansas, New Jersey, New York, Oregon
Individual Creditors Joint Creditors
Debtor Files
Singly
Debtors File
Jointly or File
Separately but are
Consolidated
No interests in
entireties property are
exemptible. Purchaser
at sale becomes a
tenant in common with
the non-debtor spouse
(purchaser not entitled
to occupancy). Trustee
may sell the entireties
property if he can
meet the statutory
criteria.
All of debtor's
interests in entireties
property are
exemptible. Trustee
may not sell the
entireties property.
No interests in No interests in
entireties property are entireties property are
exemptible. Purchasers exemptible. Trustee
at sale become tenants may sell the entireties
in common with each property if he can
other. Trustee may sell meet the statutory
the entireties property criteria.
if he can meet the
statutory criteria.
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